Incentives for Registered Reports from a risk-sensitivity perspective
The Center for Reproducible Science is excited to welcome Prof. Anne Scheel from Utrecht University and to invite you to the following talk:
Title of the talk: Incentives for Registered Reports from a risk-sensitivity perspective
Date: Tuesday 24 June, 12:15-13:15
Location: UZH City Campus, KOL-F-123
No registration required.
Abstract
Journal publications are (still) an important currency for researchers' careers. Persistent publication bias means that publication success and impact (still) depend partly on a study's results. From a researcher's perspective, this represents risk: The expected career benefits from a study vary based on a factor over which they have limited control (the results). In this context, Registered Reports are thought to be attractive because they guarantee publication before results are known, representing a 'safe' option in the publication gamble. But do researchers universally prefer a safe choice over a risky one?
Risk-sensitivity theory predicts that individuals' risk preferences vary depending on several factors, such as whether additional pay-offs yield increasing or decreasing returns for fitness. We apply this theory to researchers' publication decisions. In an agent-based model, we simulate the trade-off between a guaranteed publication in a mid-tier journal when pursuing a Registered Report and the chance of getting published in a high-impact journal when pursuing the standard publication route and obtaining unexpectedly strong results. We examine the impact of competition, 'survival thresholds' (e.g., requirements for PhD or tenure), and empirical pace (e.g., speed of data collection) and find that career-optimised publication strategies typically favour the standard route. Under certain conditions, Registered Reports are avoided even when they provide nearly the same pay-off as the most lucrative standard publications. Our findings can help identify situations (e.g., research areas, career stages) in which Registered Reports may not take hold without additional incentives or interventions, and emphasise the value of journal-independent solutions such as PCI Registered Reports.